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Canadian strike ballot laws: Barely a
tempest in a teapot
Sara Slinn and Eric Tucker*
This article locates strike ballot laws at the intersection of two of labour law’s
primary goals, promoting collective bargaining by responsible unions and
reducing industrial conflict. Depending on their design, strike ballot laws may
aim to protect democratic voice or to create an obstacle to engaging in lawful
strikes. Strike ballot requirements in Canada were initially imposed during
World War II primarily to reduce industrial conflict. The requirement was
controversial and after the war most provinces opted not to make a strike
ballot a condition of lawful strike action. Between the 1960s and the late
1990s, however, strike ballot votes became universally required in private
sector collective bargaining laws. Focusing on three Canadian jurisdictions,
this article explores the circumstances in which these laws were enacted
and the forms they took. Overall, the article finds that Canadian strike ballot
laws do not unduly burden unions when they seek a mandate to conduct a
lawful strike from their members and that they have been interpreted by
labour boards and courts as a way to protect trade union democracy rather
than to limit industrial conflict. For this reason, the issue of strike votes is not
currently a controversial topic in Canada.

Conceptual Introduction
Collective bargaining regimes are usually said to have two aims: facilitating
workers’ ability to bargain collectively and reducing industrial conﬂict. The
balance between these two objectives, however, varies over time and place, in
response to a variety of factors, including labour militancy and the
predilections of governments. The potential for conﬂict between these two
aims can be reduced by modifying the ﬁrst. Instead of promoting unionisation
in all its forms as the path to collective bargaining, policymakers may clarify
that the goal is to promote only certain kinds of unionism: responsible
unionism that accepts constraints on collective action, while discouraging or
repressing other kinds that are seen to promote labour militancy. In Canada,
and elsewhere, collective bargaining laws have often been designed to
encourage responsible unions that respect the legal framework of collective
bargaining and the employer’s right to manage. Additionally, responsible
unions are supposed to respect the democratic wishes of its members and,
particularly under the Wagner Act model of collective bargaining, the wishes
of the majority of workers in each of its certiﬁed bargaining units with respect
to whether to strike or ratify a collective agreement. However, the extent of the
regime’s commitment to this particular norm is contingent in the sense that it
is valued more highly where democratic voice restrains labour militancy
rather than facilitates it.
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. The authors would like to thank their research
assistants, Anthony Sanguliano and Lyubov Yurchak, as well as their surgeons. Without their
help this article would not have been written.
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Strike ballot laws ﬁt precisely at the intersection between the objectives of
reducing industrial conﬂict and promoting responsible unionism. For example,
the law may favour the former objective by prohibiting unions from
conducting strike votes at times when strikes would be unlawful.1 Responsible
unionism here requires the suppression of democratic decision making. On the
other hand, the law often requires unions to conduct strike votes as a
precondition for a legal strike, supposedly because we value democratic
unionism so highly that we cannot trust unions to behave democratically of
their own accord. Underlying this combination of prohibitions on holding and
requirements to hold strike votes is the desire to reduce strikes and to make
unions behave responsibly as the regime deﬁnes it.2
The balance between the objectives of strike reduction, responsible
unionism and union democracy, however, is variable. Strike ballot laws can be
designed to suppress strike activity, even if it defeats the democratic wishes of
union members, or they can be designed to protect the democratic rights of
union members even though very little conﬂict reduction results. The
overarching goal of this article is to examine the development and current
practice of private-sector strike ballot laws in Canada with a view to
understanding their role within this larger framework.3
The issue of strike ballots does not loom large in current discussions of
collective bargaining reforms in Canada. We will return to the question of why
this is so, but it is important to understand that in Canada, like in most
developed economies, strike frequency has declined dramatically over the past
three decades.4 There are many reasons for this decline, but neither repressive
law in general, nor strike ballots in particular, explain very much of it. This
very low level of private sector strike activity may contribute to Canadian
governments’ lack of interest in private sector strike suppression
mechanisms.5
1 In Canada, strikes are expressly prohibited while a collective agreement is in force. As well,
procedural requirements, such as strike votes, commonly must be complied with for a strike
to be legal.
2 A recent study of Canadian private sector work stoppages between 1978 and 2008 found
mandatory strike votes had no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on strike incidence, but a signiﬁcant
reduction in strike duration: see M Campolieti, R Hebdon and B Dachis, ‘The Impact of
Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strike Activity and Wage Settlements’ (2014) 53
Industrial Relations 394. The ﬁndings relating to duration accord with earlier research: see
M Gunderson and A Melino, ‘The Effects of Public Policy on Strike Duration’ (1990)
8 Journal of Labor Economics 295; P Cramton, M Gunderson and J Tracy, ‘The Effect of
Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages’ (1999) 81 Review of Economics
and Statistics 475. However, it does not appear that these ﬁndings have inﬂuenced
governments’ decisions regarding strike ballot requirements.
3 The limitation to the private sector is pragmatic. Legislative authority over labour law is
primarily vested in the provinces. Each province typically has one statute covering the large
majority of private sector workplaces, but many different statutes for the public sector. For
example, separate collective bargaining statutes exist in Ontario for police, ﬁreﬁghters,
teachers, etc. A review of the dozens of public sector collective bargaining laws would
require separate treatment.
4 E Tucker, ‘Can Worker Voice Strike Back? Law and the Decline and Uncertain Future of
Strikes’, in A Bogg and T Novitz (Eds), Voices at Work: Continuity and Change in the
Common Law World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p 455; J Godard, ‘What Has
Happened to Strikes?’ (2011) 49 BJIR 282.
5 Strike frequency has also declined in the public sector, but not as rapidly as in the private
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However, that was not always the case. Discussion of strike votes and other
mechanisms to restrict strike activity and promote responsible unionism were
much more prominent during earlier periods when strikes were seen as a threat
to the national economy. Therefore, this article begins from a historical
perspective, looking at the adoption of measures to reduce industrial conﬂict
from the early twentieth century and the development of legal prerequisites for
lawful industrial action, including strike votes, during World War II and in the
post war era to 1960. We then trace the spread of strike ballot laws from 1960
through to the present day. For this latter period we focus on three, illustrative,
jurisdictions: British Columbia, Ontario and the federal jurisdiction. We next
look at how these laws have been interpreted and applied in Canada. In the
concluding section we return to the larger question of the reasons why strike
ballot laws in Canada are not contentious.

The History of Strike Votes
Origins
The history of government controls on strikes in Canada begins in the ﬁrst
decade of the twentieth century. The number of strikes tripled in this decade
compared to the previous one, reaching unprecedented levels and the
government became alarmed at their impact on the national economy,
particularly because of strikes on the railways and in the coal ﬁelds.6 Some
nineteenth century provincial legislation attempted to encourage dispute
resolution by creating voluntary conciliation procedures, but these measures
were unused. The federal government adopted a more coercive approach in
the 1907 Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA).7 The IDIA applied to
mining, transportation and other sectors of the economy where labour
disruptions could have substantial economic effects. It prohibited strikes and
lockouts until the parties underwent a process of conciliation and violators
could be prosecuted, although this was rarely done.
The federal government’s constitutional authority over labour relations was
successfully challenged in 1925, and the application of the IDIA was limited
to federally regulated sectors of the economy.8 However, within a few years
most provinces either opted to apply the federal law or enacted similar
legislation. Therefore compulsory conciliation as a precondition for industrial
conﬂict remained the norm in many important economic sectors. Substantive
(rather than procedural) prohibitions on strikes were ﬁrst introduced as a
temporary measure toward the end of World War I but had no lasting impact.
This did not change signiﬁcantly during the Great Depression, although some
sector, consequently its share of strikes has increased: see J B Rose, ‘Constraints on Public
Sector Bargaining in Canada’ (2016) 58 JIR 93 at 104–6. This is true despite the fact that the
freedom to strike in the public sector is more restricted than in the private, and that those
restrictions have increased in recent decades: see L Panitch and D Swartz, From Consent to
Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms, Garamond Press, Aurora, 2003.
6 D Cruikshank and G S Kealey, ‘Strikes in Canada, 1891–1950’ (1987) 20 Labour 85;
J Fudge and E Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers’ Collective Action
in Canada, 1900–1948, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2004.
7 Industrial Disputes Investigation Act SC 1907 c 20.
8 Toronto Electric Commissioners v Snider [1925] AC 396.
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provinces required compulsory conciliation in all labour disputes, while others
adopted stripped-down versions of the 1935 American Wagner Act. None of
these statutes added further substantive or procedural restrictions on the
freedom to strike.9
The situation changed dramatically during World War II when a strike wave
swept the country, affecting war industries.10 The federal government’s
authority was greatly expanded under the War Measures Act, which allowed
it to govern by order-in-council and to extend its jurisdiction into matters
normally within provincial authority.11 The federal government was reluctant
to impose substantive restraints on striking and focused instead on procedures
and guidelines. It ﬁrst extended the IDIA to all war-related industries and then
adopted wage guidelines, but the combination of measures failed to reduce
conﬂict. In September 1941 the federal government shifted direction,
permitting the Minister of Labour to order a government supervised strike
vote if the minister was of the opinion that the strike might interfere with
efficient production. In announcing PC 7307, the minister explained its goal
was to ‘to prevent the calling of strikes by snap decisions of minority groups
and to ensure minimum interference with war production’.12 Consequently,
strikes in war industries were illegal until conciliation had been completed, the
employees notiﬁed the minister they were contemplating a strike and, if a
strike vote was ordered, a government-supervised strike vote was conducted
and a majority of the employees affected by the dispute voted in favour.
Anyone who struck in violation of the order, or who incited others to do so,
was liable to a ﬁne of up to $500, or imprisonment up to 1 year, or both.13
Needless to say, the order was very unpopular with unions, but not because
they opposed strike votes in principle. To the contrary, most international
union constitutions required strike votes, if only because the leadership was
concerned with irresponsible local action that could drain the union’s coffers
or disrupt its larger bargaining strategy. What unions objected to was
government supervision and the regulatory framework it imposed. Although
PC 7303 provided that the vote, if ordered, had to take place within 5 days of
notice being given, all employees whose employment might be affected by the
strike could vote, which could include supervisors and clerical staff. It also
required a majority of all those entitled to vote rather than those who voted.
Finally, the order prevented unions from conducting strike votes prior to
conciliation. This was problematic because unions often held strike votes as a
pressure tactic to convince the employer and the government there was a real
strike threat.14 This odd combination of prohibiting unions from conducting
strike votes before the completion of conciliation and requiring supervised
strike votes after, suggests that the goal of strike prevention took precedence
9 Fudge and Tucker, above n 6, pp 51–88, 139–227.
10 J Webber, ‘The Malaise of Compulsory Conciliation: Strike Prevention in Canada During
World War II’ (1985) 15 Labour 57.
11 War Measures Act SC 1914 c 2.
12 Canada Department of Labour, ‘Restriction of Right to Strike in Canadian War Industries’,
Labour Gazette, Ottawa, 1941, at 1209.
13 Order in Council PC 7307, 1941.
14 W Cuthbertson, Labour Goes to War: The CIO and the Construction of a New Social Order,
1939–1945, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 2012, pp 64, 79.
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over any genuine concern with union democracy.
PC 7307 was amended later that year to slightly modify how the voting
constituency would be determined by giving the minister discretion to decide
which employees ‘in his opinion are affected by the dispute’15 and then
repealed in September 1944, 6 months after PC 1003 introduced a new
collective bargaining regime to Canada.16 While PC 7307 was in force, 75%
of strike votes succeeded, suggesting that generally union members were
aligned with their leaders rather than being the hapless victims of their
organisations. However, strikes were averted in two-thirds of all the disputes
in which applications were made, suggesting that the threat of a strike vote
itself helped produce a negotiated compromise.17
The new regime brought in by PC 1003 was modeled on the American
Wagner Act, which provided for government administered certiﬁcation of
unions and required employers to bargain with certiﬁed unions. The
certiﬁcation procedure was designed to reduce industrial conﬂict by
eliminating recognition strikes, which it did, but PC 1003 went further by also
prohibiting strikes during the term of the collective agreement. Instead,
disputes over the interpretation and application of collective agreements were
to be resolved by binding arbitration. Notably, PC 1003 did not require a strike
vote.

The immediate post-war period (1945–59)
During the war emergency, Canadian provinces retained legislative authority
over labour relations in industries that were not war-related. However, most
followed the federal government’s lead and abandoned strike votes when they,
too, adopted Wagner Act laws in 1944. The exception was Alberta, which, just
before the war’s end, amended its provincial statute to require supervised
strike votes in response to concern that a segment of Alberta unions was
communist dominated and could not be trusted to act responsibly or in their
members’ interests.18 Thus, with the exception of Alberta, Canada emerged
from the end of the war with a national labour relations regime that neither
prohibited nor required strike votes.
After the war provinces resumed their jurisdictional authority and all
governments adopted versions of PC 1003 prohibiting certiﬁcation strikes and
strikes during the life of the collective agreement, and requiring conciliation
prior to work stoppages. However, there was no consensus on strike votes and
several different approaches were taken.
The federal government’s proposed 1947 legislation covering labour
relations in the federal jurisdiction did not require strike votes but, following
15 Order in Council PC 8821, 1941.
16 Order in Council PC 6893, 1944; Order in Council PC 1003, 1944.
17 Calculated from F R Anton, Government Supervised Strike Votes, C C H Canadian Ltd,
Toronto, 1961, p 11. Early in 1944 the National War Labour Board issued a report that
criticised delays resulting from the strike vote requirement: see Canada National War Labour
Board and C McTague, Report of National War Labour Board Arising out of Its Public
Inquiry into Labour Relations and Wage Conditions: Together with a Minority Report,
King’s Printer, Ottawa, 1944, at 6, 17.
18 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act SA 1945 c 63 s 4; Industrial Conciliation and
Arbitration Act SA 1938 c 57 s 46(4); Anton, ibid, at 24.
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the precedent of PC 7307, prohibited them while the collective agreement was
in force and until conciliation had been completed. The Canadian Congress of
Labour opposed this restriction while the Canadian Manufacturers’
Association called for mandatory supervised strike votes as a condition of
strike legality.19 Other provinces, including Manitoba, New Brunswick, and
Newfoundland adopted similar legislation prohibiting strike votes until after
certain conditions were met, but not requiring them.
In contrast, three provinces adopted mandatory strike votes. Nova Scotia
required a majority of all employees in the unit to vote for a strike, but the vote
was not required to be government supervised, it just had to be ‘secret’.20
Alberta retained its wartime government-supervised strike vote requirement,
despite organised labour’s opposition.21 The requirement that strikes had to be
approved by a majority of the ‘employees affected’ was amended in 1950 to
require majority approval by employees in the bargaining unit.22
In British Columbia, strike votes were even more controversial. The
Minister of Labour opposed requiring government-supervised strike votes, but
the governing Liberal-Conservative coalition imposed them anyway,
notwithstanding demonstrations by organised labour and challenges in the
Legislative Assembly from the labour friendly opposition party, the Canadian
Commonwealth Federation, which characterised the supervised strike vote as
‘the most vicious system ever introduced in Canada’. The government, with
support from the press, stood ﬁrm and the amended bill was passed. The
BC provision was less onerous than the Nova Scotia or the Alberta laws in that
only a majority of those casting ballots had to be in favour.23
This was the legal landscape in Canada in the late 1950s when Frank Anton
undertook his study of supervised strike votes in North America. He found no
evidence to support the proposition that government-supervised strike votes
tended to reduce the number of strikes and concluded that the question of
whether such votes better enabled union members to express their true wishes
than union-supervised secret ballot votes could not be empirically tested.
Given these results, Anton questioned the justiﬁcation for government
supervision.24
19 Canada Department of Labour, ‘Industrial Relations Bill Introduced by Government’,
Labour Gazette, Ottawa, 1947, at 923–40; Canada Department of Labour, ‘Fair Wage
Conditions in Dominion Government Contracts’, Labour Gazette, Ottawa, 1947, at 1003;
Canada Department of Labour, ‘Convention of Canadian Manufacturers’ Association
Considers Labour Relations’, Labour Gazette, Ottawa, 1947, at 1114; Union representatives
who authorized an unlawful strike vote were liable to a ﬁne of $300: see Industrial Relations
and Disputes Investigation Act SC 1948 c 54 s 21.
20 Trade Union Act, SNS 1947 c 3 s 24(3); Canada Department of Labour, ‘Labour Legislation
Enacted by the Parliament of Canada and the Nova Scotia Legislature in 1947’, Labour
Gazette, Ottawa, 1947, at 1329. The original bill only required a majority of those voting.
21 Alberta Labour Act SA 1947 c 8; According to Anton, labour leaders promised to expel
communists from their ranks to satisfy the concern about irresponsible unions, but this was
not acceptable to the government. As a trade-off, the government granted unions a dues
check-off clause: see Anton, above n 17, pp 24–5.
22 Act to amend Alberta Labour Act SA 1950 c 34 s 28(b).
23 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act SBC 1947 c 44 ss 31A, 72.
24 Anton, above n 17, at pp 144–52. See also F R Anton, ‘Strike Voting Under Government
Supervision’ (1960) 3 Canadian Public Administration 299. Writing shortly after Anton’s
study, economist Stuart Jamieson examined the historical experience of strikes in British
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The expansion of mandatory strike votes: (1960-present)
The appeal of mandatory strike votes in the immediate post-war era had been
rather limited as most Canadian governments were content to allow unions to
regulate their internal affairs. This began to change in the 1960s, and by 1998
every Canadian jurisdiction required a strike vote as a condition of engaging
in a lawful strike. As is evident from Table 1, below, this change occurred
incrementally and there is no obvious pattern to this development. Rather,
each jurisdiction seems to have acted in response to local events although as
more provinces embraced mandatory strike votes it is fair to surmise that this
had some inﬂuence on the others. Liberal and conservative parties were more
or less equally responsible for the enactment of mandatory strike vote laws,
while the more labour friendly parties, the New Democratic Party (NDP) and
the Parti Québécois of that era, were responsible for only two of these laws.
Space does not permit a thorough account of developments in each province,
but to provide a ﬂavour we have chosen to discuss British Columbia, Ontario
and the federal jurisdiction.
Table 1 Adoption of mandatory strike vote provisions in general labour legislation
and government in power

British Columbia
As we noted, British Columbia was one of the three provinces to adopt a
mandatory strike vote law at the end of World War II, and it required
government supervision. The legislation was tweaked in 1948, 1954 and 1960
Columbia and speculated that government supervised strike votes may have had the
unintended effect of prolonging strike activity as government supervision offers an ‘aura of
official government sanction’ to strikes: see S Jamieson, ‘Regional Factors in Industrial
Conﬂict: The Case of British Columbia’ (1962) 28 Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science 405 at 416.
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to end mandatory government supervision while imposing a secret ballot
requirement.25 This was followed in 1968 by the termination of government
supervision even on request.26 In 1973 the new Labour Code of British
Columbia included mandatory strike votes, but not government supervision.27
In 1976 a conservative social credit government introduced additional
procedural requirements for conducting strike votes, and expressly permitted
the labour board to declare a vote void where it was satisﬁed it had not been
held in accordance with the regulations.28 Extensive regulations prescribing a
signiﬁcant role for the labour board in conducting strike votes were introduced
in 1978.29 However, following the election of an NDP government in 1991, a
review of labour legislation by special advisers recommended removing the
requirement for labour board involvement in votes, regarding it as
unnecessary if the legislation contained rules for conducting the votes.30 They
also recommended permitting a union to continue a work stoppage by striking
without a vote where the employer had initiated the stoppage with a lockout.
These recommendations were reﬂected in Labour Code amendments the
following year.31 Strike votes have not subsequently been an issue in this
province.

Ontario
Ontario, Canada’s most populous and industrialised province, enacted its ﬁrst
strike vote law in 1960, which required the protection of voters’ anonymity but
did not make strike votes mandatory.32 The issue did not arise again that
decade, despite the strike wave that swept across the province in the late
1960s. Notably, a royal commission appointed to examine industrial conﬂict,
headed by Mr Justice Ivan Rand, did not recommend mandatory strike votes
even though it is generally regarded as advocating for stricter regulation of
25 Act to Amend Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act SBC 1948 c 31 ss 2, 77, 78;
Labour Relations Act SBC 1954 c 17 ss 50(1)(a)–(b); Labour Relations Act SBC 1960 c 205
s 52; Anton, above n 17, pp 65–75.
26 Mediation Commission Act SBC 1968 c 26 s 70. Anton reported on the frequency and
results of strike votes in BC for the periods 1952–58 and 1964–68, which were apparently
the only years for which data was available during this time. During these 12 years, strike
votes had nearly 90% voter turnout among the 184,268 workers eligible to cast ballots, and
79% of ballots supported strike authorisation: see F R Anton, ‘Work Stoppages: Should
Authorization be Mandatory?’, in S M A Hameed (Ed), Canadian Industrial Relations,
Butterworth, Toronto, 1975, p 347 at p 351.
27 Labour Code of British Columbia Act SBC 1973 c 122 ss 81, 82.
28 Labour Code of British Columbia Amendment Act, 1976, SBC 1976 c 26 s 4(a)(1).
29 BC Reg 39/78; British Columbia Government, Order in Council 242/78, 3 February 1978
amending BC Reg 522/73, later repealed and replaced by BC Reg 247/87, which imposed
less detailed regulation of strike votes, but retained labour board control over some aspects
of the vote.
30 J Baigent et al, Recommendations for Labour Law Reform: A Report to the Honourable Moe
Sihota, Minister of Labour, Queen’s Printer, Victoria, 1992, p 42.
31 Labour Relations Code SBC 1992 c 82 s 60; BC Reg 7/93 in force 13 January 1993,
repealing BC Reg 247/87, repealing BC Reg 522/73.
32 Labour Relations Amendment Act 1960, SO 1960 c 54 s 25(2); courts held that violations
of the secrecy requirement did not render the strike unlawful: see Industrial Wire and Cable
Ltd; Canadian Labour Congress [1961] OLRB Rep March 451 cited in H W Arthurs, ‘Book
Review: Government Supervised Strike Votes’ (1962) 40 CBR 139.
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strikes.33 Two years later the government tweaked the Labour Relations Act to
require unions to provide voters ‘ample opportunity to cast their ballots’ in
voluntary strike votes.34
This is how matters stood until after the election of Ontario’s ﬁrst
NDP government in 1990. The following year the government undertook a
review of labour legislation. Reﬂecting the contentious nature of this inquiry,
the Labour Law Reform Committee review produced separate management
and labour reports. The management report recommended a mandatory secret
ballot on the employer’s last offer and contract ratiﬁcation votes but did not
recommend a mandatory strike vote.35 The labour representatives’ report,
however, recommended considering mandatory strike votes provided that the
union determined the timing of the vote.36 This appears to have been
something of a trade-off to try to secure tight restrictions on the use of
replacement workers. However, strike votes were not required in the
subsequent legislation.
Four years later the Progressive Conservative Party won the provincial
election running, in part, on an aggressively anti-labour platform which
frequently invoked the phrase ‘workplace democracy’ to justify proposed
labour law changes. The new government quickly introduced extensive
reforms, including mandatory strike votes and a restriction on when they
could be held. This was introduced as a key element of the new legislation,
and said to be necessary to ensure that ‘the voice of an individual employee
in the bargaining unit is heard in every instance in determining collective
bargaining outcomes’.37 The Minister of Labour claimed that strike votes were
not held in many cases, and explained that restrictions on the timing of the
vote were necessary because employees have difficulty making informed
decisions about strikes early in bargaining. Nonetheless, the minister
emphasised that strike votes would not be government supervised, but would
continue to be administered by unions. These mandatory strike provisions
remain in force today with the exception of the construction industry.38

33 I C Rand, Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes, Ontario Royal
Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes, Queen’s Printer, Toronto, 1968; H C Goldenberg,
‘The Law and Labour Relations: A Reaction to the Rand Report’ (1969) 24 Industrial
Relations 308.
34 Act to amend Labour Relations Act SO 1970 c 85 s 24.
35 Labour Relations Act Reform Committee, Report of the Management Representatives to the
Labour Law Reform Committee of the Minister of Labour, 14 April 1991, at 29.
36 Ministry of Labour, Partnership and Participation in the 1990’s: Labour Law Reform in
Ontario, Report of the Labour Representatives to the Labour Law Reform Committee of the
Minister of Labour, Ontario, 14 April 1991 at 58.
37 Bill 7, Act to Restore Balance and Stability to Labour Relations and to Promote Economic
Prosperity, Ontario, Ministry of Labour Media Kit, 4 October 1995.
38 Ontario, Legislative Debates, Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 18 October 1995, at 1630
(E Witmer); SO 1995 c 1, Sch A, as amended, s 79(3). In 1998, to reward construction
unions for their support, the newly elected liberal government exempted the construction
industry from mandatory strike ballots and certiﬁcation elections: see SO 1998 c 8.
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The Federal Jurisdiction
The federal government was the last jurisdiction to introduce mandatory strike
votes, in 1998.39 The question of strike votes had previously been considered,
but rejected in the late 1960s. The Woods Task Force, which undertook the
ﬁrst major Canada-wide study of the post-war collective bargaining regime,
released its report in 1968. The report rejected mandatory strike votes, but
recommended that when votes were held that they be regulated to ensure
secrecy and access. It also rejected a prohibition on premature strike votes;
instead recommending that, where a strike vote was required by legislation, a
vote would not be valid unless it was held after the union was in a legal strike
position — that is after the conciliation process was completed.40 The
rationale for these recommendations was not framed in terms of strike
prevention, but rather appeared in a section of the report dealing with union
rights and responsibilities. Interestingly, the recommendations regarding strike
votes differed from the views of expressed in a background study for the task
force on the topic of union responsibility. There, Earl Palmer examined the
constitutions of 50 unions and found that 32 contained strike vote provisions,
including 29 specifying secret ballot strike votes. Although ﬁnding that
constitutionally dictated secret strike votes were common, Palmer
recommended a legislative requirement for a secret ballot strike vote among
bargaining unit members as a precondition to a legal strike.41
The impetus for the 1998 introduction of a mandatory strike vote came from
the 1996 report of the Sims Task Force, which had reviewed Part I of the
federal Canada Labour Code.42 The task force noted the nearly unanimous
employer support for mandatory strike votes, and reported that labour’s key
objections to these votes were that they might give rise to litigation and delay
legitimate strikes. Although it recognised that most unions held strike votes,
the task force appeared concerned that votes held early in the bargaining
process, before the employer’s bargaining position was clear, allowed the vote
to become a strategic bargaining tool. The task force was also concerned that
some unions only permitted members to vote, excluding non-members
covered by the agreement from participating in what it characterised as a
‘fundamental question’. The task force viewed these features as the source of
employer skepticism about the validity of such votes.43 Consequently, it
concluded that:
We believe that a mandatory strike vote adds an important element to collective
bargaining. Unions and the employees they represent are not disconnected from one
another. Unions, as democratic organizations, customarily take their mandates from
their members, particularly on crucial questions like the decision to take industrial
39 An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code SC 1998 c 26 ss 37, 38.
40 Canada Task Force on Labour Relations and H Woods, Canadian Industrial Relations: The
Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations, Privy Council Office, Ottawa, 1968,
pp 152–4.
41 E E Palmer, Responsible Decision-Making in Democratic Trade Unions, Task Force on
Labour Relations, Ottawa, 1969, pp 148–9. See especially Table XXVII.
42 Sims Task Force, Canada Labour Code, Part 1: Review: Seeking a Balance, Public Works
and Government Services Canada, Ottawa, 1996.
43 Ibid, at 104–5.
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action. A visible and proximate reaffirmation of that fact is healthy because it
reinforces the legitimacy of the union’s position in the eyes of the employer, the
employees and the public at large.44

Clearly the task force regarded unions incapable of ensuring legitimate strike
vote procedures. It recommended mandatory secret ballot strike votes, with all
employees in the bargaining unit eligible to vote, advance notice of the poll to
be posted in the workplace, with the decision to be based on the majority of
ballots cast, and results to be ﬁled immediately with the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service. It also recommended that the labour board be
permitted to set out rules for conduct of the vote and determine whether these
have been satisﬁed. Notably, the task force recommended that a strike vote
should not be required for a strike that is in response to an employer lockout.
However, it cautioned that the strike ballot provision was not meant to provide
employers with a way to avoid or delay legal strike action. It recommended
short time limits for challenges to strike vote validity and that the board should
only hear challenges that raised serious questions about the vote outcome.45
Finally, the task force recommended that unions continue to administer strike
votes, but that a strike vote could be taken no more than 60 days prior to strike
notice in order for the vote to be valid.46
The federal liberal government subsequently enacted strike vote provisions
in substantially the form recommended by the report. In introducing the strike
vote provisions, the government echoed the task force’s concerns about
exclusion of non-member employees from voting, and ballots held early in
bargaining not reﬂecting true support for a work stoppage.47 By imposing a
time limit on early votes the government sought to ensure strike ballots are
‘less of a bargaining tactic to pressure employers and more of an authentic
expression of the employees’ wishes’48 and that employees would ‘fully
realise the importance of such action and not make any rash decision’.49 It is
clear from debates on these amendments that concern about economic harm
from work stoppages and fear of wildcat strikes strongly inﬂuenced
legislators.

Conclusion
The apparent lack of government interest during the 1960s in using strike vote
laws to reduce strike activity is perhaps somewhat surprising given that the
mid- to late-1960s was a period of growing labour conﬂict, which included
wildcat strikes while collective agreements were in force.50 Governments’
interest in and detailed regulation of strike votes expanded in the 1970s. Thus
44
45
46
47
48

Ibid, at 105.
Ibid.
Ibid, at 106.
Canada, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 3 March 1997, at 8531 (G Proud).
Canada, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 19 November 1996, at 6421
(R Nault).
49 Canada, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 19 November 1996, at 6423
(Discepola).
50 P McInnis, ‘Hothead Troubles: 1960s-Era Wildcat Strike Culture in Canada’, in L Campbell,
D Clément and G S Kealey (Eds), Debating Dissent: Canada and the Sixties, University of
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2012.
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for a while it appeared the risk noted by Paul Weiler (the prominent labour law
scholar and ﬁrst chair of the BC Labour Board), that once governments began
requiring and regulating strike votes they will increase the level of detail of
regulation, was going to materialise.51 However, we see that governments
generally resisted this impulse and chose not to closely regulate strike votes.
Indeed, it is telling that unions have not pressed to have mandatory strike vote
laws repealed when labour friendly governments were in power.
The motivation for strike vote requirements remains a combination of strike
prevention and the protection of worker voice in union decision-making, with
the latter becoming more predominant over time. This is likely a result of a
growing recognition that mandatory secret strike vote laws requiring a
majority of the ballots cast by bargaining unit members do little to deter
strikes. Strike votes are often seen as a way for unions to gain leverage in the
bargaining game and so in most cases workers vote in favour of giving the
union a strike mandate. However, there is perhaps less trust that left to their
own devices unions will conduct strike votes fairly. This explains why many
of the early strike vote laws did not require strike votes, but did stipulate that
when they were held they must be by secret ballot. However, the distrust does
not run so deep as to require government supervision.

The Current Law and Practice of Strike
Votes in Canada
Summary of the current law
Table 2 below summarises the salient features of Canada’s strike vote laws.
Every jurisdiction now requires that a strike vote be held, and all strike votes
are conducted by the union. In Alberta the labour board supervises the vote
and provides fairly detailed rules about its conduct.52 Elsewhere, fairly
minimal strike vote requirements are written into the statute, regulations or
labour board rules.
Except in Quebec, all bargaining unit members have a right to vote, which
outside of a closed shop, would include both union members as well as those
who are not. The requirement to give all bargaining unit members a vote can
be understood largely in terms of the North American model of exclusive
bargaining agency, whereby unions represent all workers in the bargaining
unit, not just their members, and thus have a duty of fair representation
towards these non-members.
A secret ballot is required in all jurisdictions and, with the exception of
Nova Scotia, a successful vote requires a majority of those voting to be in
favour of a strike. Only Nova Scotia requires a majority of eligible voter.
Some provinces stipulate when strike votes may be taken and a few make
provisions about how long after the strike vote is conducted it remains valid.
There are a variety of provisions regarding who may challenge the validity of
51 P Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New Directions in Canadian Labour Law, Carswell,
Toronto, 1980, p 73.
52 Alberta Labour Relations Board, Information Bulletin: #16, Strike and Lockout Votes,
Alberta, 2007.
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strike votes and the consequences of invalidity.53
This summary seems to indicate that strike ballot laws in Canada have not
developed primarily as tools of strike suppression but rather as a manifestation
of light regulation of union practices designed to insure that strikes do not
occur without majority support. There is little data collected on strike votes
because, except in Alberta, there is no need to apply to government to conduct
one and there is no direct government supervision.54 We therefore turn to the
case law to get a sense of the types of issues that have arisen and whether these
seem to be causing unions signiﬁcant problems when they attempt to engage
in lawful strikes.

53 For a more detailed summary: see G W Adams, Canadian Labour Law, Westlaw,
Online edn, L 11.7.
54 The Alberta Labour Relations Board does not routinely publish statistics on strike votes and
we have not requested data.
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Case law
With 11 jurisdictions with subtly different strike vote provisions, we cannot
provide a comprehensive review of contemporary labour board decisions in
this area. Instead, we offer a representative examples of Canadian labour
boards’ approaches to strike vote requirements and consequences of their
violation.
Labour boards tend not to adopt a formalist or rigid approach to strike vote
requirements when faced with challenges, either by employers or dissident
members of the bargaining unit, and explicitly discourage unnecessary
litigation, particularly where the issue will not affect the vote outcome.55
The Ontario Labour Relations Board has narrowly interpreted its authority
to intervene in the conduct and form of strike votes, explaining that unions’
decisions about calling and conducting strike votes are subject only to
restrictions arising expressly, or by necessary implication, from the
legislation.56 The board characterised the question as: ‘not how much
employee democracy is enough — that is a choice for the Legislature to make
— but how much employee democracy has been prescribed’.57 The board
dismissed the employer’s argument that a ballot combining a ratiﬁcation vote
and strike vote was ‘undemocratic’:
[T]here is absolutely nothing ‘undemocratic’ about a ballot that requires a choice
between the ‘realistic’ options that the Board has said present themselves when
collective bargaining has reached an impasse, ie to accept the proposed agreement
or to reject it and authorize a strike to do better.58

Some board decisions explicitly recognise, and seek to avoid, unnecessary
delay disadvantaging the union as a possible consequence of strike vote
requirements. For example, the Alberta Labour Relations Board, which
supervises votes according to a more detailed set of rules than other
jurisdictions, rejected an employer’s argument that all disputes over
challenged voters be determined prior to ballots being counted. It concluded
that if the board allowed the employer’s claim ‘we would in effect be
abandoning our legislated neutrality and instead actively aiding one party to
the labour dispute’ as in the circumstances delay would have reduced the
likelihood of a strike. The board also found that the employer’s position would
be inconsistent with its statutory obligation to supervise strike votes
‘forthwith’.59
Labour boards have also taken a generous view of who is eligible to vote,
55 See, eg, Re Chatellier [2008] CIRBD No 18; Re Construction Labour Relations — An
Alberta Association Roofers (Provincial) Trade Division [2007] ALRBD No 79.
56 Wal-Mart Canada Inc [1998] OLRB No 4654 at [45].
57 Ibid, at [52].
58 Ibid, at [54]; The OLRB’s judgment was upheld: see [1999] OJ No 2855, but the statute was
later amended to prohibit combined ratiﬁcation and strike votes in ﬁrst contract negotiations:
see Labour Relations Amendment Act SO 2000 c 38 s 11.
59 Re Construction Labour Relations — An Alberta Assn Roofers (Provincial) Trade Division
[2007] ALRBD No 79 at [13].
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the test being whether bargaining unit members have a sufficient and
continuing interest in the outcome of the collective bargaining dispute. This
may include members who have been laid off or dismissed for cause but who
may challenge their termination.60
While protection of worker voice may be the primary purpose of strike
ballot laws, it would be an overstatement to say that there is no recognition in
the legislation of their potential to reduce strikes. British Columbia’s law
emphasises this role by prohibiting strike votes until after parties have
bargained. However, the board interprets this provision as requiring an
exchange of proposals and some discussion, but does not require extensive
negotiations.61 This approach encourages rational discussion, but minimises
the opportunity to use the requirement as a means of postponing strike votes.
Of course, not all challenges to strike ballot procedures fail, and boards will
step in to maintain the procedural integrity of the voting process. These cases
involve issues such as failure to notify members of the vote or adequately
protect voter secrecy.62 In cases of extreme violations, the board will intervene
even where the breach is not likely to affect the vote outcome.63 However,
there is not always agreement on where that line is. For instance, other boards
have come to different conclusions than the Ontario board did about whether,
and how, strike and ratiﬁcation votes may legitimately be combined in a single
ballot.64
This leads to the question of what happens when a strike vote is found not
to comply with legal requirements. Several jurisdictions speciﬁcally provide
for challenging strike votes and offer remedies if a violation is found.
Typically, boards are empowered to set aside the vote and order a new one. Of
course, in the absence of a valid strike vote, a lawful strike cannot occur.
Consequently, the union will be subject to all the liabilities that result from
unlawful strikes.
Although further research is required, for the most part it seems as if most
challenges to strike votes occur before a strike starts. This would be logical
since most strike votes are taken to demonstrate the seriousness of the union’s
position and the strength of bargaining unit support. Andrew Sims, then chair
of the Alberta Labour Relations Board, articulated this view clearly in a case
where a union that was prohibited from striking nevertheless held a strike
vote:
A strike vote is not just a poll of member opinions, or an authorization process. It
is also a lever, an intimation of the ability and intent to strike, frequently taken to
show the other side that the Union ‘means business’. Strike votes are frequently
timed for their effect upon bargaining.65
60 For discussion of this line of cases: see Re Citation Industries Ltd [1988] BCLRBD No 299.
61 British Columbia Public School Employers’ Association v Okanagan Valley School
Employees Union 2000 CanLII 27783 (BC LRB).
62 Blue Con Inc [1995] OLRD No1672; CAW-Canada Local 112 v Toromont [1994] OLRB
Rep 1149.
63 Jim Pattison Industries Ltd v IWA Canada Local 1–3567 [2000] BCLRBD No 140 at [69].
64 Saskatchewan Telecommunications and CWEC [1987] May Sask Labour Rep 55; Canada
Steamship Lines Inc v Canadian Merchant Service Guild [2002] CIRB No 201.
65 Alberta Hospital Association v UNA [1988] Alta LRBR 129.
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This strategic use of strike votes may also explain their historic prevalence in
union constitutions and practices even prior to statutory ballot requirements.
Finally, we need to remember that the law also limits the taking of strike
votes precisely because the goal of preventing strikes trumps the protection of
worker voice. In circumstances where the bargaining unit is statutorily
deprived of the ability to strike (as is the case for many public sector workers),
the calling of a strike vote, or the threat to do so, constitutes violation of
statutory prohibitions on unions encouraging unlawful strikes. In these cases
the board will direct that the strike vote not be taken. Violation of the board
order may lead to proceedings for civil or criminal contempt. Even though the
boards recognise that strike votes have a tactical role, they are not permitted
where the group of workers is prohibited from striking.66
In one sense, illegal, wildcat strikes can be viewed as ‘striking’ acts of
democratic unionism — workers on the shop ﬂoor acting in concert to protect
immediate concerns. Of course, such democratic expressions are not tolerated
and laws are designed to impose signiﬁcant costs on unions, officers and union
members who defy the strike ban. A union official who conducts olds a strike
vote or sponsors a meeting at which untimely strike action is discussed could
be prosecuted for violating the labour code and the union could be held liable
for damages to the employer, even though the official tried to persuade
members not to strike.67 Certainly holding a vote to determine whether to
comply with a court injunction, ordering workers to return to work is beyond
the pale. In R v United Fishermen & Allied Workers’ Union the Supreme Court
of Canada upheld a judgment of the BC Court of Appeal that a union and its
leaders had committed criminal contempt of court by calling such a vote.68 As
well, the courts also held that even timely strikes would be illegal if the union
failed to comply with the voting requirements. Not only did this expose union
representatives to prosecution for violating labour legislation, but it also made
the strike illegal for the purposes of the common law so that an injunction
could issue to stop the strike and the union could be held liable for damages.69

Conclusion
The current law of strike votes in Canada, both as it is written and as it is
interpreted by labour boards and courts, helps explain why it is not a
particularly controversial topic at this time. The legal requirements are fairly
straightforward and do not unduly burden unions when they seek a mandate
to conduct a timely strike from their members. While occasionally labour
boards talk about the strike vote requirement in terms of its industrial conﬂict
reduction function, it is more common for boards to view strike votes as
legitimate tools in the bargaining game, provided that the strike vote is taken
in a context when strikes are permitted. There is also fairly consistent
expression of support for the role of strike votes as a requirement of union
66 Ibid.
67 Labour relations acts prohibit unions from threatening to call unlawful strikes or from doing
anything to procure or encourage such strikes.
68 R v United Fishermen & Allied Workers’ Union [1968] SCR 255.
69 Jacobson Brothers Ltd v Anderson [1962] NSJ No 23. See also cases cited in Arthurs, above
n 32.
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democracy and as a mechanism that protects worker voice in decisions that
will have an important impact on their lives. The picture is very different,
however, where strike votes are taken in a context when strikes are not
permitted. Then labour boards will view strike votes as fomenting and
legitimating unlawful conﬂict and sanctions may be imposed on union
officials who permit such exercises of worker voice. Because Canadian unions
for the most part have accepted the ‘normal’ limitations on their freedom to
strike, they do not seem to greatly object to the current state of the law and
have made few efforts to challenge or change it.

